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Abstract 
 This essay fills a gap by exploring compliance theory in international 
law to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  After introducing the topic 
and setting the context, it delves into the question of why nations follow 
international law.  Interacting with prominent theoretical models (including 
the managerial model, fairness and legitimacy, transnational legal process, 
self-interest, and a comparative perspective with Europe), it arrives at a 
critical synthesis in the conclusion.  
 
Member State Compliance with the Judgments of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights in its Inception Phase 
 
 Non-compliance with the judgments of a court, considered the serious 
offence of "contempt of court" here in the United States, can carry serious 
penalties, especially criminal contempt of court.1  In the case of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights,2 hereinafter called the IACHR, the 
                                                 
 1 18 USCS §401 (2005); see also Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958); 
Rebecca Yoheved Starr, Twenty-Eighth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: 
Authority of the Trial Judge, 87 GEO. L.J. 1590 (1999). 
 2  “The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the sole judicial organ in the 
Inter-American human rights system. As such, it is the final arbiter of human rights in 
those American States that have ratified the American Convention on Human Rights.” 
JO M. PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2003); see also Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights 76 A.I.J.L 231 (1982). Since the Inter-American system of Human 
Rights was created, the creation of a judicial organ was a vital necessity. See CARLOS 
GARCIA BAUER, LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS EN AMERICA [The Human Rights in 
America] (1987). “The Court’s purpose is specifically defined as the application and 
interpretation of the Convention. In carrying out its purpose the Court exercises both 
an adjudicatory and advisory jurisdiction.” SCOTT DAVIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1992); see also Jo M. Pasqualucci, Advisory Practice of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Contributing to the Evolution of 
International Human Rights Law 38 STAN. J INT’L L. 241 (2002). For more 
information on the advisory jurisdiction, see MANUEL E. VENTURA ROBLES & DANIEL 
ZOVATTO, LA FUNCION CONSULTIVA DE LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS 
HUMANOS: NATURALEZA Y PRINCIPIOS [ THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: NATURE AND PRINCIPLES] (1982-1987). For 
more information about the operation of the Human Rights Court, see Antonio 
Augusto Cancado Trindade, The Operation of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS  (David J. Harris & 
Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998). For a detailed history of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Right, see also Víctor Rodríguez Rescia & Marc David Seitles, The 
Development of the Inter-American Human Rights System: A Historical Perspective 
and a Modern-Day Critique 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 593 (2000); LA CORTE 
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sequellae seem less overt yet nonetheless maintain a sizable influence.3  One 
might ask how a court such as the IACHR, given its lack of police or armed 
forces to enforce its orders, could possibly have a high rate of compliance 
from sovereign states.  Yet at least at a certain level, the Court has had a very 
high level of compliance.4 
 
 It can be argued, as Prof. Douglass Cassel at Northwestern University 
School of Law does, that the Court has only had one and a half full-blown, 
defiant responses.5  He writes especially about the Peru crisis6 (but also 
mentions Trinidad and Tobago)7 in "Peru Withdraws from the Court:  Will the 
Inter-American Human Rights System Meet the Challenge?"8 
 
 Cassel first lays out a foundational paradox found in the Inter-
American system of human rights:9 the IACHR is at the zenith of its 
                                                                                                                    
INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS [The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights] (1986); The Inter-American Court of Justice, at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/ 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2005). 
 3 There are less overt but nonetheless real and perceived consequences for not 
complying: they can come in diplomatic, economic, political and social dimensions, 
for examples. 
 4 While the Court has eventually received compliance with its reparation orders, 
it has had difficulty in getting State compliance with orders for States to press 
criminal prosecution in their domestic systems. 
 5 Douglass Cassel, Peru Withdraws from the Court: Will the Inter-American 
Human rights System meet the Challenge? 20 HUM. RTS. L.J. 167, 167-168 (1999). 
 6 “The interaction between Peru and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(Court) over the last few years has spawned a series of pathbreaking events. The 
Court issued unprecedented remedial judgments in cases that were brought against 
Peru under the American Convention of Human Rights and that arose out of the 
conviction and sentencing of civilians in military tribunals by so-called faceless 
judges pursuant to emergency decree laws on terrorism and treason.  For the first time 
in its history, the Court ordered a state to release a prisoner, to nullify judgments of its 
courts and to reform its domestic laws.” Bernard H. Oxman & Karen C. Sokol, 
International Decision: Ivcher Bronstein Human Rights—Law of treaties –
Jurisdiction of Inter-American Court of Human Rights—Effect of Attempted 
Withdrawal of Jurisdiction, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 178 (2001). 
 7 Trinidad and Tobago, which had been a State Party, denounced the American 
Convention on May 26, 1998, effective May 26, 1999. PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE, supra note 2; see also Richard J. Wilson & Jan Perlin, The 
Inter-American Human Rights System: Activities from Late 2000 Through October 
2002, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 651 (2003). 
 8 Cassel, supra note 5, at 167; see also Karen C. Sokol, Human Rights-laws of 
Treaties-Jurisdiction of Inter-American Court of Human Rights-Effect of Attempted 
Withdrawal of Jurisdiction, 95 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 178-185 (2001).  Sokol writes about 
the path-breaking nature of the interactions between Peru and the IACHR. 
 9 “The inter-American human rights system is composed of a series of 
international documents. The principal human rights tools include: the American 
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acceptance as well as the exercise of its broad formal powers yet it contends 
with a relative paucity of diplomatic support.10  This divide came to the 
forefront during the crisis of Peru's attempted withdrawal from the Court.11 
 
 Peru, which through former President Fujimori (who fled the country 
in October 200012) had tried to openly defy the Court,13 has since formally re-
entered its place within the Court's jurisdiction.14  Ivcher,15 who had lost his 
                                                                                                                    
Convention on Human Rights, and its accompanying protocols; the Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights; and the Protocol to the American Convention on Human 
Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty. In addition, three regional inter-American 
conventions seek to broaden the scope of protected human rights: the Inter-American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture; the Inter-American Convention on Forced 
Disappearance of Persons; and the Inter-American Convention for the Prevention, 
Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women.” Rescia & Seitles, supra 
note 2; see also DAVIDSON, supra note 2; TOM FARER, THE RISE OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME: NO LONGER A UNICORN, NOT YET AN OX, THE 
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1998); Jo. M. Pasqualucci, Victim 
Reparations in the Inter-American Human Rights System: A Critical Assesssment of 
Current practice and procedure, 18 MICH J. INT’L L. 19 (1996). 
 10 Supra note 5, at 167; see, e.g., Financial Situation of the Court, 1997-1998 
INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 31, OAS/Ser. L/III.29, doc. 5 (1998). 
 11 Cassell, supra note 10. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was 
informed by the Peruvian Embassy in Costa Rica that Peru adopted Legislative 
Resolution No. 27401 on January 18th, 2001.  This Resolution charges the Executive 
Branch to do everything necessary to re-establish the State of Peru under the 
contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/PRENSA/2001/cp_2_esp.htm] (last visited 2003). 
 12 “A popular uprising in the year 2000 forced Fujimori to flee to Japan, where he 
was seeking protection as a national, so as not to stand trial for multiple human rights 
violations” Sonia Picado, The Evolution of Democray and Human Rights in Latin 
America: A Ten Year Perspective No. 3, HUM. RTS. BRIEF 28 (2004). 
 13 “Peru made history by becoming the first state to deposit its withdrawal from 
the Court's jurisdiction without denouncing the American Convention.  The Court 
deemed the withdrawal ineffective: even though states may ratify the American 
Convention before or without ever accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, 
once they do accept that jurisdiction, they may denounce it only through denunciation 
of the Convention as a whole.” Peru may therefore not return to the status quo ante; 
once committed to the American Convention and the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court, it is both or none.  Oxman & Sokol, supra note 6. 
 14 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/PRENSA/2001/cp_4_esp.htm 
4 (last visited Sept. 2003).  The Ivcher Bronstein case, Interpretation of the Judgment 
on the Merits: Art. 67 American Convention on Human Rights, Judgment of 
September 4, INTER-AM. CT. H.R., (ser. c), No. 84 (2001), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/84-ing.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2005). 
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During this session, the Court delivered on the 6th of February.  The Court decided 
unanimously:  
1. to declare that the State violated the right to a nationality found in Article 
20.1 and 20.3 of the American Convention of Human rights against Baruch 
Ivcher Bronstein.  
2. to declare that the State violated the judicial rights in Article 8.1 and 8.2 of 
the American Convention of Human Rights against Baruch Ivcher Bronstein. 
3. to declare that the State violated the right to judicial protection found in 
Article 25.1 of the American Convention of Human Rights against Baruch 
Ivcher Bronstein.  
4. to declare that the State violated the right to private property found in 
Articles 21.1 and 21.2 of the American Convention of Human Rights against 
Baruch Ivcher Bronstein. 
5. to declare that the State violated the right of free expression found in Articles 
13.1 and 13.3 of the American Convention of Human Rights against Baruch 
Ivcher Bronstein.  
6. to declare that the State did not meet its general obligation in Article 1.1 of 
the American Convention of Human Rights in connection with the violations 
of substantive rights spoken of in the previous resolution points prior to this 
Sentence.  
7. that the State ought to investigate the deeds which generated the violations 
established in the present Sentence in order to identify and sanction the ones 
responsible for them. 
8. that the State ought to facilitate the conditions for Baruch Ivcher Bronstein 
would be able recover the use and enjoyment of his rights as the majority 
owner of his Latin American Company as it was before August 1, 1997 
according to the terms of the domestic legislation.  Domestic law applies to 
the compensation pertaining to the dividends as the majority shareholder.   
For all of this, the respective requests ought to be submitted to the 
competent, national authorities.  
9. The State ought to pay in equity Baruch Ivcher Bronstein an indemnization 
of $20,000.00 or its equivalent in Peruvian currency to effectuate the 
payment of moral damages. 
10. In equity, the State ought to pay Baruch Ivcher Bronstein the sum of 
$50,000.00 U.S. dollars or its Peruvian equivalent to make him whole for the 
costs related to the domestic as well as international litigation.  
11. The Court would supervise the execution of the Sentence until the closing of 
the case. 
On March 14th, 2001, the Court decided the following in regards to the Ivcher 
Bronstein case: 
1. To lift the provisional measures ordered by the Court in its resolutions of 
November 21st and 23rd, 2000 in favor of Baruch Ivcher Bronstein, his wife, 
Neomy Even de Ivcher, and their daughters Dafna Ivcher Even, Michal 
Ivcher Even, Tal Ivcher Even and Hadaz Ivcher Even as well as Ms. Rosario 
Lam Torres  and Julio Sotelo Casanova, Jose Arrieta Matos, Emilio 
Rodriguez Larra?, Fernando Via? Villa, Menachem Ivcher Bronstein y 
Roger Gonzalez. 
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2. To communicate the present Resolution to the State and to the Inter-
American Commission.  
3. To archive the legal proceedings relative to the provisional measures in this 
case. Tribunal Constitucional de Peru at http://www.tc.gob.pe/ (last visited 
February 18th, 2005). 
[again unofficial paraphrase/translation of official material on the Court's web 
page] The Inter-American Court of Human Rights in San Jose, Costa Rica in its 
sessions from January 29th to February 9th, 2001, decided the following matters:  
1. The Constitutional Court case. During the time of these sessions, the Court 
delivered this sentence on January 31st:  
Unanimously,  
1. to declare that the State violated judicial guarantees found in Article 
8 of the Convention against Manuel Aguirre Roca, Guillermo Rey 
Terry y Delia Revoredo Marsano. 
2. to declare that the State violated the right to judicial protection 
found in Article 25 of the Convention against Manuel Aguirre 
Roca, Guillermo Rey Terry y Delia Revoredo Marsano. 
3. to declare that the State did not fulfill its general obligation under 
Article 1.1 of the Convention with respect to the violations of the 
substantive rights in the previous resolution points in this Sentence. 
4. that the State ought to order an investigation to determine the 
responsible parties in the human rights violations that were done in 
the matters pertaining to this Sentence in order to reveal the results 
of this investigation and punish those responsible. 
5. that the State ought to pay the amounts corresponding with the 
salaries in conformity with the legislation to Manuel Aguirre Roca, 
Guillermo Rey Terry y Delia Revoredo Marsano, in agreement with 
what was established in paragraphs 121 and 128 of this Sentence.  
6. In equity, that the State ought to pay the costs of the victims of the 
present case in accordance with paragraphs 126 and 128 of this 
sentence the following amounts: to Mr. Manuel Aguirre Roca 
US$25,000.00 or its Peruvian equivalent at the time of effectuating 
the payment; to Mr. Guillermo Rey Terry US$25,000.00 or its 
Peruvian equivalent at the time of effectuating the payment; and 
Mr. Delia Revoredo Marsano US$35,000.00  at the time of 
effectuating the payment.   
7. that the Court would supervise the completion of the Sentence until 
the conclusion of the case. 
The Constitutional Court case Provisional Measures on March 14th, 2001, the 
Court resolved:  
1. To lift the provisional measures ordered by the Court in its 
Resolution of August 14th, 2000 for Delia Revoredo Marsano. 
2. To communicate the present Resolution to the State of Peru and to 
the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights.  
3. To archive the legal proceedings. 
  15 See Oxman & Sokol, supra note 6. 
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television station, has had his station restored to him.16  The Peruvian 
Constitutional Court Justices17 ousted by former President Fujimori have been 
reinstated.18 The Court can count itself the victor through the Peruvian crisis.19 
 
 Trinidad and Tobago,20 which withdrew over capital punishment 
cases,21 has rejoined (with reservations) the community of Latin American 
                                                 
  16 See Wilson & Perlin, supra note 7. 
  17 See Interpretation of the Judgment on the Merits: Art. 67 American 
Convention on Human Rights, Judgment of September 4, supra note 18. 
  18 Jurisdiction, Resoluciones y Sentencias, Series C, No. 55 (2000), available 
at http://corteidh oea.nu.or.cr/ci/PUBLICAC/SERIE_C/C_55_ESP.HTM (March 7, 
2005); see also Interpretation of the Judgment on the Merits: Art. 67 American 
Convention on Human Rights, Judgment of September 4, supra note 18, “While 
Ivcher was struggling to regain his citizenship and his rights in the television station, 
President Alberto Fujimori, serving his second term, was endeavoring to overcome 
the limitations of Peru's 1993 Constitution, which prohibits a president from serving 
more than two consecutive terms.  Fujimori's first term began in 1990, three years 
before the Constitution came into effect. In 1996, the Peruvian Congress enacted a 
statute that interpreted the term limitation as inapplicable to presidential terms that 
began prior to the approval of the Constitution. Three of the seven justices (with two 
abstentions) on Peru's Constitutional Tribunal (Tribunal Constitutional) invalidated 
the new statute, however, as it 'applied to the specific case of the incumbent 
President's candidacy for the office of President in the year 2000,'  thereby threatening 
to frustrate Fujimori's ambitions for a third presidential term. Four months later, the 
Congress impeached the three justices  and then voted in favor of removing them 
from the Constitutional Tribunal. Pursuant to a petition filed by a number of Peruvian 
congressional deputies, the Commission issued a report finding that Peru had violated 
the justices' rights to a fair trial, as well as the right of all Peruvians to an independent 
and impartial justice system. The Commission recommended that Peru reinstate the 
justices, but Peru failed to comply or to reach a friendly settlement after negotiations 
with the petitioners. The Commission then submitted the case to the Court.” See also 
Oxman & Sokol, supra note 6. 
 19 For more details about the Peruvian crisis, see ANA SALADO OSUNA, LOS 
CASOS PERUANOS ANTE LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 
[PERU’ S CASES BEFORE THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS] (2004). 
 20 Wilson & Perlin, supra note 7.  
 21 “During 2001 and 2002, the Court decided both the admissibility and merits of 
a collection of death penalty cases from Trinidad and Tobago (‘Trinidad’). The Court 
first considered Trinidad's preliminary objections in three separate cases, the Hilaire 
Case, the Benjamin et al. Case, and the Constantine et al. Case.  The cases were later 
consolidated for disposition on the merits and reparations under the name Hilaire, 
Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago. All of these cases present 
complex issues of treaty application and treaty reservations, arising from Trinidad's 
aggressive efforts to defend its death penalty regime. Because of its desire to speed up 
executions, Trinidad withdrew its ratification of the Convention on May 26, 1999, 
one year after its announced intention to do so. The Commission and Court 
nonetheless continue to apply the Convention to all pending cases that arose when the 
Convention was in effect” Id. 
326 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION [Vol. 33:3 
 
nations under the jurisdiction of the Court.  So the Court has prevailed 
through the one and a half outright challenges against it, both with Peru as 
well as Trinidad and Tobago.22  
 
 As of yet, no one has assessed the general state of compliance to the 
IACHR.23  This article aims to start filling this gap in the scholarly literature.  
It also seeks to provide some theoretical grounding to compliance with 
international law, why the Court has received the degree of compliance it has 
had, as well as theory based clues to how the Court might gain greater 
compliance and influence24—since its work plays a critical role in bringing 
greater justice to this hemisphere.25   
 
Background and Foundation 
 
 A brief background of the Inter-American human rights system helps 
to set the stage for understanding the history, practice and procedure of the 
Inter-American court, which in turn gives context to the issue of 
compliance.26 
 
 The Court was installed in Costa Rica through a series of acts starting 
from September 3, 1979 in the National Theater of San Jose.  The National 
Theatre, appropriately enough, was the location where the American 
                                                 
 22Interview with Professor Douglass Cassel, Northwestern University School of 
Law (Feb. 8, 2001).  
 23 Id.; also see Mark W. Janis, The Efficacy of Strasbourg Law, 15 CONN. J. OF 
INT'L L. 39 (2000).  Janis notes gaps in the compliance literature for the European 
system.  There seem to be appreciably more gaps in the existing Inter-American 
human rights system literature. 
 24 “Evaluating accomplishments and prospects in the area of international human 
rights law recalls the oft-used rhetorical question about whether the glass is half 
empty or half full. As far as human rights are concerned, if the question is 'how much 
has been achieved,' the answer must be 'a great deal.' If the question is 'how much 
remains to be achieved,' the answer will be the same: 'a great deal.' This statement 
made by Thomas Buergenthal about the accomplishment of international human 
rights in general could be applied to the Inter-American system of Human Rights. 
Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights Law and Institutions; 
Accomplishments and Prospects, 63 WASH L. REV. 1 (1988); see also, Michael F. 
Cosgrove, Protecting the Protector: Preventing the Decline of the Inter-American 
System for the Protection of Human Rights, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’ L L. 39 (2000). 
 25 See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & DOUGLASS CASSEL, EL FUTURO DEL SISTEMA 
INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCION DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS [THE FUTURE OF THE 
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS] INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS (1998). 
 26 See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & DINAH SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN THE AMERICAS: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed., 1995). 
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Convention (with which the Court is supposed to adjudicate) had been drafted 
close to a decade earlier.27   
 
 The Convention entered into force on July 18, 1978 when Grenada 
deposited its instrument of ratification to the Convention.  Grenada acted as 
the pivotal eleventh member state of the OAS to do so.28  On May 22, 1979, 
the States Parties to the Convention elected seven judges to serve as the 
original Inter-American Court of Human Rights.29 
 
 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the sole judicial organ 
in the Inter-American human rights system. As such, it is the final arbiter of 
human rights in those American States that have ratified the American 
Convention on Human Rights. As of January 2003, twenty-four of the thirty-
five Member States of the OAS are State Parties to the American 
Convention.30 
 
 During its early years, the Court’s prospects for improving the human 
rights of the people of the Americas appeared uninspiring. Dictators in the 
Western Hemisphere perpetrated gross and systematic violations of human 
rights. State-sponsored forced disappearances, extra-judicial killings, and 
torture were commonplace. The court’s principal vehicle for contributing to 
international law during that period was its advisory opinions.31 
 
 When the Commission began to refer contentious cases to the Court, 
and the Court pronounced violations of human rights, it shocked the 
governments of newly emerging democracies.  These States equated the need 
for human rights enforcement with peremptory power, not unlike the prior 
caudillos.  Some feared that States would refuse to participate in proceedings 
before the court, a recurring problem before the International Court of Justice 
at that time.  This fear proved largely unfounded.   States responded to 
                                                 
 27 Installation of the Court, 1980-1983 INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 9, OEA/ser. 
L/V/III.3, doc. 13 corr. 1 (1980).  
 28 Entry into Force of the American Convention, 1980-1983 INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 
7, OEA/ser. L/V/III.3, doc. 13 corr. 1 (1980). 
 29 Their names and nationalities are as follows: Thomas Buergenthal (United 
States), Máximo Cisneros Sanchez (Peru), Huntley Eugene Munroe (Jamaica), Cesar 
Ordonez Quintero (Colombia), Rodolfo Piza Escalante (Costa Rica), Carlos Roberto 
Reina Idiaquez (Honduras), M. Rafael Urquia (El Salvador). 
 30 “These states are Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. Trinidad and Tobago, which had been a State Party, 
denounced the American Convention on 26 May 1998, effective 26 May 1999.” 
PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 2. 
 31 Id. 
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applications filed against them by designating agents, filing memoranda, and 
appearing and arguing at public hearings. To be sure, States often filed 
preliminary objections, many of which were frivolous; however, when the 
Court denied these objections, the states presented their defenses. 
 
 The reputation of the Inter-American Court increased as a result of 
the quality of its jurisprudence.32  The status of the Court is reflected in the 
status of State witnesses who have appeared before it to defend State actions.  
For example, in The Baena Ricardo Case, in which 270 former State 
employees alleged that they were illegally dismissed from their jobs as a 
result of an ex post facto law, Guillermo Endara, the former president of 
Panama, and his vice-president testified before the Court. 33 in which 270 
former State employees alleged that they were illegally dismissed from their 
jobs as a result of an ex post facto law, Guillermo Endara, the former 
president of Panama, and his vice-president testified before the Court. 
Eventually, some States accepted responsibility for the human rights 
violations before the Court reached a judgment--leaving only the issue of 
reparations to be decided.34  The acceptance of international responsibility on 
the part of the State indirectly acknowledged that an Inter-American Court 
judgment attributing responsibility to a State for human rights violations 
would be taken seriously—both domestically and internationally.35 
 
 State compliance with Court-ordered reparations has similarly moved 
forward. As the Court has no coercive mechanisms in and of itself to enforce 
judgments, some thought that States would simply ignore them and refuse to 
make Court-ordered reparations to the victims. Honduras, under the 
presidency of Carlos Roberto Reina, a former Inter-American Court judge, 
eventually paid the compensation ordered by the Court.  Most other States 
have also paid pecuniary compensation ordered by the Court, although many 
have balked and delayed payment for extensive periods. 
                                                 
 32 For criteria referring cases to the Court, see Claudio Grossman, President’s 
Inaugural Session Speech at the 95th Regular Meeting of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1115 (1998). 
 33 Baena Ricardo et al. (270 Workers v. Panama): Merits, Inter-Am. Court H.R., 
Series C, No. 72, ¶ 65(h)-(i) (2001). 
 34 “Cases in which States have accepted international responsibility include 
Barrios Altos (Chumbipuma Aguirre et al v Peru) (Merits), Case 75, Inter-Am 
C.H.R., para 31 ser.c, doc. 75. (2001); Aloeboetoe et al v Suriname (Merits), Inter-
Am. C.H.R., para 22, ser.c, doc. 11(1991); El Amparo v Venezuela (Merits), Inter-
Am. C.H.R., para 19, ser c, doc. 19 (1995); Garrido and Baigorria v Argentina 
(Merits), Inter-Am C.H.R., para 25, ser. c, doc. 26, (1996); Del Caracazo v Venezuela 
(Merits), Inter-Am C.H.R, para 37, ser c, doc. 58 (1999). Las Palmeras v Colombia 
(Merits), Inter-Am. C.H.R., para 19, ser c, doc. 90 (2001) accepting partial 
responsibility.” PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE , supra note 2 at 8. 
 35 PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE , supra note 2.  
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 Redress extends beyond compensation alone. The Court may also 
order the State to take actions or to desist from particular acts. When Peru 
complied with the Court’s order to release from prison Maria Elena Loayza 
Tamayo,36 a college professor, it marked a new level of State compliance.37 
Upon the Court's order, Peru also later released Cesti Hurtado from prison.38 
 
 Subsequently, in certain cases when the Court has declared a 
domestic law or judgment to be in violation of the American Convention, 
States have amended the laws,39 domestic courts have declared them 
unconstitutional,40 or domestic court judgments have been annulled.41  These 
developments exalt Inter-American human rights law to supranational stature. 
 
 There exists, however, another level of State compliance with Court 
orders not yet commonly observed in the Inter-American system.  The Court, 
in almost every case, orders the State to investigate, prosecute and punish the 
individuals responsible for the human rights violations. These orders seldom 
find fulfillment.  In most cases, impunity reigns, and the State power structure 
lacks the means or the will to bring the perpetrators of human rights violations 
to justice.  Some day, if and when the States regularly follow Court orders to 
prosecute and punish the violators, the Court will have contributed 
substantially to the fall of impunity and to the specific and general deterrence 
of human rights violations in this hemisphere.42 
 
 The initial apprehension that the member states would withdraw their 
acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction or denounce the American Convention 
has not generally met with reality.  Only one State, Trinidad and Tobago, has 
denounced the Convention and the Court’s jurisdiction, but it later returned 
with reservations.43  Peru, which had announced its intention to withdraw its 
                                                 
 36 See Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (Merits), Inter-Am. C.H.R. para 5, 84, ser. c, doc. 
33 (1997).  
 37 PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 2.  
 38 Cesti Hurtado v. Peru (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 29 
September 1999) Inter-Am. C.H.R., order of 19, ser. c, doc. 62 (1999). 
 39 Cantoral Benavides v Peru (Reparations), Inter-Am. C.H.R., para 76, ser c, 
doc. 88 (2001). 
 40 Suarez Rosero v. Ecuador (Reparations) (Art.63 (1), American Convention of 
Human Rights), Inter-Am. C.H.R., para 76, ser c, doc. 88 (2001); PASQUALUCCI, 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 2. 
 41 Cesti Hurtado v. Peru (Reparations) Inter-Am. C.H.R., para 15, ser. c, doc. 78, 
(2001). 
 42 PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 2.  
 43 See Natasha Parassran Concepcion, The Legal Implications of Trinidad & 
Tobago’s Withdrawal from the American Convention on Human Rights, 16 AM. U. 
INT'L L. REV. 847 (2001). 
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recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction, has since reaffirmed its acceptance of 
the Court's jurisdiction.  Moreover, additional States beyond the original 
member states have both ratified the Convention, and accepted the Court’s 
jurisdiction.44 
 
Agreement for the Court's Establishment and its Impact Towards 
Compliance 
 
 The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Costa 
Rica and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights established the legal 
context in which the Court operates within its host country.45  Some of the 
portions of this agreement have a direct or indirect impact on our topic at 
hand. 
• Article 1 provides that the IACHR is "autonomous."46   
• Article 3 helps the Court to build a community of law. 47    
• Article 5 provides that the Court will enjoy the immunities and 
privileges in the "Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the 
Organization of American States.”48  This article expressly takes "into 
account the importance and independence of the Court."49   
• Article 6 protects the premises and archives of the Court from 
interference by any government search, seizure or interference.  
Given the sensitive nature of rulings against national governments, this 
safeguard helps embolden the Court by making its archives and premises 
inviolate.50 
 
                                                 
 44 See Press Release, Peruvian Legislative Resolution No. 271532, Inter-Am. 
C.H.R., CP2/01, at http://corteidh.or.cr. (last visited Mar. 6, 2005). 
 45 Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 1980-1983 INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 16, 17 OEA/ 
ser. L/III.5, doc. 13 (1981) [hereinafter, Costa Rica Agreement]. 
 46  This is important because such a body must ideally be independent of the type 
of political pressure that could distort its judgment. 
 47 It provides that the Court may enter into agreements of cooperation with law 
schools, bar associations, domestic courts, and research institutions dealing with 
human rights so that the Court can strengthen the principles of the Convention and the 
Court itself. Id. at 18. 
 48 Id. at 17.  
 49 Again, this independence is crucial for establishing the impartiality of the 
Court.  This official acknowledgment of the importance of the Court, while possibly 
viewed as token, is nonetheless an official pronouncement by the Government of the 
Republic of Costa Rica, the host country of the Court.  Especially during this 
formative period of the Court, such an official endorsement by Costa Rica could only 
be seen as a boon towards greater recognition and legitimacy, which aid in 
compliance. Id. at 17.  
 50 Id. at 18-19. 
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 Financial protection is also built into the agreement.  Article 7 forbids 
taxes on the Court with the exception of charges for public utility services.  It 
also bars the imposition of customs, duties or charges for official use by the 
Court.  It specifically protects the Court's publications from any such customs, 
duties or charges.  This Article prevents retaliatory charges from being placed 
on the Court.  Economic pressure in these forms is thus forbidden by the 
agreement.  In this way, the Court is protected from some illicit attempts at 
swaying or intimidating it by attacking its figurative pocketbook.  Such a 
measure increases the Court's financial independence.  51 
 
 Article 8 further protects the Court's pocketbook by permitting the 
Court to operate accounts in any currency, hold funds in a foreign currency, 
transfer funds between countries, and convert currency without financial 
controls, regulations or moratoria of any kind. This monetary authorization 
without the burden of financial controls, regulations or moratoria would be 
important, for example, when there are monetary reparations to handle.  If 
these protections were not in place, a country ordered to pay reparations could 
impose regulations that would in effect circumvent the payment of the 
reparation.52  In this same vein, any judicial or administrative process, 
according to Article 9, cannot touch the Court, its assets, income and other 
property. This immunity includes not being subject to domestic courts unless 
the IACHR expressly waives its immunity in a particular case.  Article 9 thus 
gives the Court the liberty to judge without being judged itself by other 
courts.53   
 
 The Court also has what is known as a "total franking privilege." 
What this means is that the IACHR does not have to pay for postage on its 
mail.  Furthermore, the Court enjoys favorable treatment of its official 
communications at the level of diplomatic missions as to the rates, taxes, 
press rates, and priorities for its communications.  These Article 10 privileges 
come with insulation against censorship of its correspondence and other 
official communications of the Court.  The Court may even use codes to relay 
messages secretly.  These measures at once prevent interference with the 
Court's communications as well as help facilitate these communications.54     
 
 After Article 10 begin Chapters III-IX, which largely deal with the 
privileges and immunities of the Court and those who appear before the 
Court. These privileges include the granting of travel documents such as visas 
or diplomatic passports.  Also, the immunities and privileges for judges are 
grounded minimally in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 
                                                 
 51  Id. at 19. 
 52  Id. at 17. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 20. 
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which Costa Rica ratified.  Chapter IV, Article 14 extends the same 
immunities and privileges to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of the Court 
with the exception that they shall not be granted the category of chiefs of 
mission.  Staff receive the privileges and immunities found in the Agreement 
on Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of American States of May 
15, 1949 as well as any other treaties in force.  Chapter IX, Article 26 c) 
grants immunity for persons appearing before the Court from all 
administrative or judicial proceedings during their stay in Costa Rica, unless 
the Court waives this immunity out of necessity.  Victims and claimants alike 
have the same immunities and privileges.55   
 
 Chapter XI, Article 28 provides that Costa Rica will continue to 
subsidize the Court annually in an amount not less than its initial grant, which 
is recorded in the Law of the General Budget of the Republic of Costa Rica.56  
For an introductory overview of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
one would do well to read "A United States View of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights."57 
 
Compliance Theory 
 
 Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter provide factors pertaining 
to what they refer to as supranational adjudication in their rigorous and 
informative article, "Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication."58  While their immediate application is to the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ),59 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)60 and the 
                                                 
 55 Id. at 20-25.   
 56 Id. at 26. 
 57 Douglass Cassel, A United States View of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, in THE MODERN WORLD OF HUMAN RIGHTS/ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THOMAS 
BUERGENTHAL, 209 (1996). It covers the Court's first 15 years while giving an 
American professor's view on why the U.S. might consider accepting the Court's 
contentious jurisdiction. 
 58 Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J., 273 (1997). 
 59 European Court of Justice, at http://europa.eu.int/institutions/court/ (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2005).  
 60  “In the European Court of Human Rights, individuals can sue states-parties to 
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [ECHR]. Just 
about every western and eastern European State (including Russia) is a state-party to 
the European Convention. As in the Inter-American system, private individuals and 
corporations cannot be sued. States, however, can be sued for failure to prevent 
foreseeable gross human rights violations committed by private persons. Furthermore, 
corporations can - and often do - sue states-parties. Only in dicta has the European 
Court recognized that shareholders can sue in exceptional circumstances. The 
European Court provides monetary damages, legal fees and costs awards; however, it 
does not provide injunctive relief and has not provided punitive damages. Another 
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United Nations Human Rights Committee,61 they explicitly state how their 
"checklist" of factors could be applied to other international62 (or 
supranational/aspiring towards supranational status) bodies.63  These factors 
                                                                                                                    
aspect of the adequacy of these international tribunal systems concerns the time it 
takes for the case to reach its conclusion. Assuming that the case is found admissible 
and the tribunal reaches the merits and damages award stage, the proceedings can last 
anywhere from two to ten years, depending on the case's complexity and the tribunal's 
interest in a particular case. The Inter-American system will generally take longer 
because of its lack of financial and staff resources and each case's two-stage process 
of going through both the Commission and Court. On the other hand, in addition to 
having more money and a larger staff, cases before the European Court do not have to 
go through a commission. The Inter-American system however, does have friendly 
dispute resolution mechanisms built into it that expedite the resolution of cases. 
Unfortunately, the European system no longer appears to have such a strong, friendly 
dispute resolution mechanism in place, as the old European Commission of Human 
Rights was dismantled a few years ago.” Francisco Forrest Martin, The International 
Human Rights & Ethical Aspects of the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine, 35 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 101 (2003); See The European Court of Human Rights, at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2005); Luis Ignacio Sanchez Rodriguez, 
The American and European Human Rights’ System,  LA CORTE Y EL SISTEMA 
INTERAMERICANOS DE DERECHOS HUMANOS [The Court and the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights] (1994), at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (last visited Feb. 18, 
2005). 
 61 “The United Nations Human Rights Committee was established to monitor the 
implementation of the Covenant and the Protocols to the Covenant in the territory of 
States parties. It is composed of 18 independent experts who are persons of high 
moral character and recognized competence in the field of human rights. The 
Committee convenes three times a year for sessions of three weeks' duration, 
normally in March at United Nations headquarters in New York and in July and 
November at the United Nations Office in Geneva.” United Nations Human Rights 
Committee, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/a/introhrc.htm (last visited Mar. 
6, 2005). 
 62 "The term ‘international tribunal’ is referenced in a number of United States 
statutes. From these statutory obligations, as interpreted, one can discern a workable 
definition for international tribunals as: an objective and impartial adjudicative body 
established by or with the imprimatur of two or more governments with the power to 
make a binding decision as to law or facts. This definition falls between the two 
extremes, rejecting a litmus test that excludes many international adjudicative bodies 
that do not meet certain artificial categories, but is not so broad as to embrace the 
whole panoply of potential candidate institutions.”  Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, 
International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 675 
(2003). 
 63 “By definition, in a supranational body there is no democratically-legitimate 
hierarchical superior, as we understand that notion in a national sense. Rather, there 
are at best indirect political controls exercised by national executives over otherwise-
autonomous supranational technocratic agents who owe their loyalty to the 
membership of the supranational body as a whole rather than to any one particular 
state.” Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of 
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have not been applied as an aggregate, as far as I know, in relation to the 
Inter-American system of human rights.64  
 
 What are these factors?  Helfer and Slaughter divide up the factors 
into three main categories:  
1. Factors within the control of states party to an agreement establishing 
a supranational tribunal;  
2. factors within the control of the judiciary; and 
3. factors often beyond the control of states or judges.65 
Within the first category of factors within the control of states party to the 
agreement for a supranational tribunal's formation, they note four factors in 
descending order of importance:  
1. composition of the tribunal;  
2. caseload or functional capacity of the court;  
3. independent fact-finding capacity; and  
4. formal authority or status as law of the instrument that the tribunal is 
charged with interpreting and applying.66 
 
 Under factors within the control of the judiciary, this article finds the 
following factors the most important:  
• awareness of audience;  
• neutrality and demonstrated autonomy from political interests;  
• incrementalism;  
• quality of legal reasoning;  
• judicial cross-fertilization and dialogue; and 
• the form of opinions.67 
 
 The third cluster of factors is the one that fits into neither of the first 
two, broad categories.  The three that this article notes are:  
1. the nature of the violations;  
2. autonomous domestic institutions committed to the rule of law and 
responsive to citizen interests; and 
3. the relative cultural and political homogeneity of states subject to a 
supranational tribunal.68 
                                                                                                                    
Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628 
(1999).   
 64 Wilson & Perlin, supra note 7; Christina M. Cerna, The Inter-American System 
for the Protection of Human Rights, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 195 (2004); Pasqualucci, supra 
note 2; Michael F. Cosgrove, supra note 24. 
 65 Helfer & Slaughter supra note 58. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id.  
 68 Id.  
2005] MORSE TAN  335 
 
It would be interesting to interact with these factors in reference to what the 
IACHR has done69 and what it can yet do.70 The Slaughter/ Helfer model can 
aid in analysis.  
 
 While the IACHR has its own particular characteristics, it does draw 
significantly from the European bodies.71  The IACHR derives some of its 
substance (in the American Convention72) from the same stream that is found 
in Europe.73  The IACHR even receives funding from the European Union74 
and European Union countries.   
 
Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 
 
 Louis Henkin states that "almost all nations observe almost all 
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of 
                                                 
 69 See Manuel E. Ventura Robles, La Corte Interamericana de Derechos 
Humanos: Camino hacia un Tribunal Permanente, [The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights: The Way Towards a Permanent Court], in  LA CORTE 
INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS [The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights] (1986). 
 70 See Augusto Cancado Trindade & Manuel E. Ventura Robles, El Futuro de la 
Corte InterAmericana de Derechos Humanos [The Future of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights] (2003). To contemplate where the Inter-American system is 
at, and what direction it can go, see also Brenda Cossman, Reform, Revolution, or 
Retrenchment? International Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era, 32 HARV. 
INT'L L.J. 339 (1991). 
 71 European Court, supra note 59. 
 72 The American Convention of Human Rights (American Convention), signed in 
1969, incorporated the Commission and assigned it specified specific powers under 
the Convention.  It also created the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-
American Court). The American Convention entered into force in 1978. See the 
American Convention of Human Rights, at  
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention (February 18th, 2005); NIETO 
NAVIA, INTRODUCCIÓN AL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCIÓN A LOS 
DERECHOS HUMANOS [Introduction to the Inter-American System of Human Rights] 
(1993). 
 73 As regards regional human rights systems, “three systems are in existence 
today, one in Europe, one in the Americas, and the third, in Africa. The European 
system is the oldest of the three and is generally considered to be the most effective. 
The institutional structure established by the American Convention is modeled on that 
of the European Convention. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and 
the Inter-American Court have functions similar to those of their European 
counterparts” Buergenthal, supra note 24, at 15. For a comparison between the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, see 
Martin, supra note 60. 
 74 See European Union, at http://europa.eu.int (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). 
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the time" (emphasis omitted).75 This assertion finds corroboration in a host of 
studies?76 
 
 Andrew T. Guzman notes that, “for years international law 
scholarship generally assumed that nations tend to comply with international 
law.”77 Yet some scholars contrarily claim that noncompliance is common. 
Tragically, the assumption of compliance may most contradict the reality in 
the realm of international human rights. Despite the great increase in human 
rights instruments since World War II, noncompliance remains more common 
than one might expect.78  In the IACHR, however, compliance (at least on 
some levels) has stayed the norm with noncompliance the exception. 
 
The Managerial Model 
 
 The New Sovereignty, a crowning work by Professor Abram Chayes 
of Harvard Law School and former Legal Adviser to the U.S. State 
Department, together with Antonia Handler Chayes, who served as former 
Undersecretary of the U.S. Air Force, contend that a "managerial model" best 
accounts for compliance with international law within treaty regimes,79 such 
as the one placing countries under the jurisdiction of the IACHR.80  
“According to the Chayes, treaty compliance also derives from the need to 
maintain one's status within a highly interrelated community of states.”81 The 
Chayes state, "[T]he fundamental instrument for maintaining compliance with 
treaties at an acceptable level is an iterative process of discourse among the 
parties, the treaty organization, and the wider public."82 This is in 
contradistinction to the view that the looming threat of sanctions coerces 
                                                 
 75 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979), quoted in Harold 
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997); 
see also David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 NW. 
U. L. REV. 879 (2003). 
 76 Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? YALE L.J. 
2599 (1997). In footnote 2 Koh cites a long string of studies along these lines. 
 77 See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 
CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1826 (2002); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Treaties Make a Difference? 
Human Rights Treaties and the Problem of Compliance, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1937 
(2002). 
 78 See Moore, supra note75.  
 79 According to David Moore, "none of these approaches, however, offers a 
comprehensive description of compliance with international law in general or human 
rights in particular. To name some of the more apparent shortcomings in his view, the 
Chayes’s managerial model assumes a tendency to comply rather than explaining 
compliance." Id. 
 80 ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS, 3 (1995).   
 81 Moore, supra note 76. 
 82 Id. 
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countries to follow the treaty regime.  This observation seems to fit well with 
the compliance in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights--because the 
Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly has yet to 
administer sanctions upon any member state.83  Thus, the threat of sanctions is 
apparently not a live threat, which makes it implausible as the impetus for 
compliance with the judgments of the IACHR. 
 
Fairness and Legitimacy 
 
 New York University Law Professor Thomas Franck avers that the 
fairness of the international rules themselves constitutes the linchpin of 
compliance in his book Fairness in International Law and Institutions.84  
Franck speaks of nations bowing to international law even without the hatchet 
of formal enforcement over their heads in consideration of right process 
(legitimacy) and distributive justice.85  These notions at their best tie into the 
foundational discussion that preceded this section.  Much of Franck's own 
philosophical foundations can be found in his book, The Power of Legitimacy 
among Nations (1990).86 
 
Transnational Legal Process 
 
 Harold Koh,87 who serves as the Dean of Yale Law School and 
formerly as an Associate Secretary of State, adopts a view of transnational 
                                                 
 83 See Organization of American States, at 
http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=../../documents/eng/structure.asp 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2005), which gives the structure of the General Assembly of the 
OAS. 
 84 THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 
(1995). Franck's 1993 Hague Lectures in Public International Law provided a 
foundation from which to work.  
 85 Susan Sturm provides an overview of the literature on judicial legitimacy. 
Judicial legitimacy is more crucial for the IACHR because it does not have coercive 
measures at its disposal to compel compliance Susan P. Sturm,  A Normative Theory 
of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355 (1991); see also Scott C. Idleman, A 
Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1995). Scott identifies 
three factors that have an impact on judicial legitimacy. These factors are: 1) 
unanimity or near unanimity in decisions; 2) professional civility in opinions; 3) and 
continuity of the law over time.  The IACHR often meets the unanimity or near 
unanimity in decisions factor, seems to be a model of professional civility and 
decorum, and is still relatively young, which does not allow extensive continuity of 
the law over time. 
 86 THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).  
 87 “Harold Koh has argued that nations comply with international law as a result 
of repeated participation in transnational legal interactions with state and non-state 
actors which leads to internalization of international norms and the formation of 
national identity around those norms.”  See Moore, supra note 75. 
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legal process, which is the "complex process of institutional interaction 
whereby global norms are not just debated and interpreted, but ultimately 
internalized by domestic legal systems."88  Koh acknowledges value in the 
works of the Chayes and Franck but deems them inadequate.89 
 
 Koh sees a massive sea change in the international law scene.  The 
nature of this change includes:  
1. an erosion of national sovereignty;  
2. a multiplying of international regimes, institutions and non-state 
actors;  
3. a blurring of the public-private distinction (in international law;  
4. the rapid formation of customary and treaty-based rules;  
5. the increasing interpenetration of international systems and domestic 
ones.90  
 
 Are these traits characteristic of the Western Hemisphere where the 
Inter-American system holds sway?  To track Koh's list:  
1) state sovereignty seems to persist more in the Western 
Hemisphere than it does in places like Europe;  
2) the formation of the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights,91 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,92 the 
                                                 
 88 Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 76, at 2602; see also 
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996).  
 89 Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 76. 
 90 Id. at 2604. 
 91 “The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (Commission) was created 
in 1959 to serve as a mechanism for overseeing national implementation of such 
human rights commitments. Composed of seven members elected in their individual 
capacity, the Commission started operating in 1960 with a vague mandate. In 1965, 
its competence was expanded to accept communications, request information from 
governments, and make recommendations "with the objective of bringing about more 
effective observance of human rights."In 1967, the OAS Charter was amended, and 
the Commission became a principal organ of the OAS. The Commission has three 
forms of jurisdiction. Its conventional jurisdiction applies to the states that have 
become parties to the American Convention. Its judicial invocative jurisdiction 
provides the competence to invoke the Inter-American Court; it applies to the state-
parties to the American Convention that have accepted the Inter-American Court's 
jurisdiction. While these two forms of jurisdiction depend upon adherence to the 
American Convention, the Commission's declaration jurisdiction applies to all parties 
to the OAS Charter, indeed, to all states in the Americas. Hence, every independent 
state in the Western Hemisphere, even those which have not yet become party to the 
American Convention, is subject, in some form, to the Commission's jurisdiction. The 
Commission's jurisdiction may be invoked by citizens and organizations within the 
hemisphere.” Michael Reisman, Practical Matters for consideration in the 
establishment of a Regional Human Rights Mechanism: Lessons from the Inter-
American experience, ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 89,  (1995); see also, 
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American Convention of Human Rights,93 the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),94 MercoSur,95 
the Organization of American States96 itself and other 
examples seem to show a multiplication of international 
regimes and institutions.97  Nonstate actors like Center for 
Justice and International Law (CEJIL),98 Amnesty 
International,99 Human Rights Watch,100 the Centers for 
International Human Rights at Universities like American 
University, University of Notre Dame, Northwestern 
University and others have multiplied as well.  
                                                                                                                    
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, at http://www.cidh.org/ (last visited Feb. 
18, 2005). 
 92 See Reisman supra, note 91. 
 93 Id. 
 94 “The North American Free Trade Agreement is ‘preeminently’ a trade 
agreement .Its main purpose is the establishment of a free trade zone between Canada, 
Mexico and the United States. The agreement enumerates its objectives as the 
elimination of trade barriers with respect to goods and services; the furthering of 
conditions of fair competition; the extension of investment possibilities; the protection 
of intellectual property rights; the creation of effective procedures concerning its 
implementation, application, joint administration, and dispute settlement; and the set-
up of a framework for further cooperation.” Patrick Specht, The Dispute Settlement 
Systems of the WTO and NAFTA: Analysis and Comparison, 27 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. 
L 57 (1998). 
 95 The Common Market of the South (Mercado Comun del Sur) was created by 
the Treaty of Asuncion signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in 1991. 
Chile and Bolivia became associate members in 1996 and 1997, respectively. This is 
the most important international commitment among these countries. See Mercosur, 
at  http://www.mercosur.org.uy (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).  
 96 The Organization of American States (OAS) is a pioneer of modern human 
rights law. The OAS Charter of 1948 incorporates the "fundamental rights of the 
individual" as one of the Organization's founding principles. See The Organization of 
American States, at http://www.oas.org/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2005); see also THOMAS 
BUERGENTHAL, ROBERT NORRIS & DINAH SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
THE AMERICAS: SELECTED PROBLEMS, (3d ed. rev., 1990). 
 97 Id. 
 98 The Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) is a non-governmental, 
non-profit organization with consultative status before the Organization of American 
States (OAS), the United Nations (UN). A central component of the work of the 
organization is the defense of human rights before the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights ("the Commission") and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
("the Court”).  See Center for Justice and International Law, at http://www.cejil.org/ 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2005). 
 99 See Amnesty International, at http://www.amnesty.org/ (last visited Mar. 6, 
2005). 
 100 See Human Rights Watch, at http://www.hrw.org/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2005). 
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3) Private companies are becoming increasingly concerned 
about human rights and other such areas traditionally deemed 
to be within the realm of public, international law.101   
4) Some of the examples under 2) above illustrate the formation 
of customary and treaty based rules.  For the purposes of this 
article, the American Convention of Human Rights is the 
most pertinent example.102  
5) The work of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
powerfully illustrates the inter-penetration of international 
and domestic systems in at least several ways:  
• the obligation of nations to change their laws to be in 
conformity with a judgment of the court;  
• the fact that those in the executive branches of 
domestic governments are often charged with 
carrying out the Court's ruling;  
• that domestic judicial and investigatory bodies have 
been ordered by the Court to continue investigations 
or judicial proceedings;  
• the judgments of the Court are sometimes reported on 
by domestic media channels.   
So the changes in the international scene in general are largely found in the 
Western Hemisphere, the Inter-American system of human rights providing 
the key example.  This analysis helps to map the matrix of compliance. 
 
Self-Interest 
 
 Some scholars try to root compliance in self-interest:  “Jack 
Goldsmith and Eric Posner have rejected the notion that nations feel a sense 
of obligation to obey international law and have treated compliance as an 
ephemeral result of the convergence of a nation’s interest with the tenets of 
the law.”103  The immediate financial cost of complying with the judgments 
would tend to cut against this view.  However, the longer-term interests such 
as reputation, trade, and international relations could factor in favor of this 
view. Along these lines, Moore states that: 
Respecting human rights tend to impose immediate costs-
restraints on governments power or the costs of providing 
opportunities. Violating human rights provides, from the 
governments’s perspective, the immediate benefits of 
unrestrained action, while risking future costs, such as stunted 
                                                 
 101 Many observers have noted this trend, including Judge Delissa Ridgeway of 
the Court of International Trade.  Judge Delissa Ridgeway address, ABA Panel on 
International Law at the ABA National Conference (August 4, 2001). 
 102 See Ridgeway, supra note 101. 
 103 See Moore, supra note 75.   
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economic growth. Complying with human rights thus 
demonstrates a willingness to restrain present use of power 
for long-term benefits, while violating human rights preserves 
the full range of governments' power in the present at the 
expense of future gains.104 
 
 In this sense, Jo M. Pasqualucci refers to the informal effectiveness of 
the Inter-American Court in the sense that in repeated instances, referral of a 
case to the Court, or the Court's scheduling of a public hearing has brought 
about positive action within the state involved.105 
 
A Comparison with Europe 
 
 For a comparative analysis, Mark W. Janis, who holds the William F. 
Starr Professorship at the University of Connecticut, writes about the 
effectiveness of the European system.106  He breaks down his study of 
compliance into three categories: 1) judgments (and decisions), 2) legal rules, 
and 3) the legal system itself.107  He surveys the literature in these categories 
with prodigious footnotes.108 
 
 Janis suggests four possible tests for legitimacy, which he deems as 
"the most crucial 'practical' test for the efficacy of the Strasbourg legal 
system."109  These tests are: 
1) the case load in the European Court of Human Rights,  
                                                 
 104 Id. 
 105  “The referral of a case to an international court focuses international attention 
on the situation, and the publicity often curtails some abuses even before the Court 
reaches a judgment. Most states are surprisingly sensitive about their international 
reputations and world image. According to a former United States representative to 
the U.N. Commission of Human rights, despite the harsh realities of power politics, 
world opinion is a force to be reckoned with. Governments devote much time and 
energy, both in and out of the U.N., to defending and embellishing their own human 
rights image and demeaning that of others.” Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Inter-American 
Human Rights System: Establishing Precedents and Procedure in Human Rights Law, 
26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 297 (1994-1995); see also Jo M. Pasqualucci, 
Preliminary Objections Before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 
Legitimate Issues and Illegitimate tactics 40 VA. J INT’ L L. 1 (1999). 
 106 Janis, supra note 23; see also Christian Tomuschat, Quo Vadis, 
Argentoratum? The Success Story of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
a Few Dark Stains, 13 HUM. RTS L.J. 401 (1992).  Tomuschat devotes the third 
section of this article to enforcement, which he deems the real test. 
 107 Janis supra note 106, at 40. 
 108 Id. passim. 
 109 Id. at 44. 
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2) the acceptance of what were the two optional clauses of the 
European Convention,  
3) the growth in the number of states joining the Council of 
Europe and ratifying the Convention,110 and  
4) an increasing recognition of the legitimacy of the system.111   
Janis concludes by noting the impressive level of compliance and gives a call 
to further studies on this heretofore high level of compliance (by international 
law standards) with Strasbourg law.112 
 
 Parallel analysis of the Inter-American system of human rights 
reveals:  
1) a dramatically increased and increasing case load in the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights;  
2) broad acceptance and ratification of the American 
Convention of Human Rights with few reservations;  
3) acceptance of the jurisdiction of the IACHR by the crush of 
Latin American countries.  The English speaking countries 
like the U.S.A., Canada, and the English speaking Caribbean 
countries are exceptions in the hemisphere.  With the 
acceptance of Mexico and Brazil, it is essentially a solid mass 
of countries under the Court's jurisdiction from Mexico 
through Central America down to the bottom of South 
America;  
4) and an increasing recognition of the legitimacy of the system, 
even by Peru, which had previously posed the most serious 
challenge to the Court.113  
                                                 
 110 Albania (13.07.1995), Andorra (10.11.1994), Armenia (25.01.2001), Austria 
(16.04.1956), Azerbaijan  (25.01.2001), Belgium (05.05.1949), Bosnia & 
Herzegovina (24.04.2002), Bulgaria (07.05.1992),Croatia (06.11.1996), Cyprus 
(24.05.1961), Czech Republic (30.06.1993),Denmark (05.05.1949),Estonia 
(14.05.1993), Finland (05.05.1989), France (05.05.1949), Georgia (27.04.1999), 
Germany (13.07.1950), Greece (09.08.1949), Hungary (06.11.1990), Iceland 
(07.03.1950), Ireland (05.05.1949), Italy (05.05.1949), Latvia (10.02.1995), 
Liechtenstein (23.11.1978), Lithuania (14.05.1993), Luxembourg (05.05.1949), Malta 
(29.04.1965), Moldova (13.07.1995), Monaco (05.10.2004), Netherlands 
(05.05.1949), Norway (05.05.1949), Poland (26.11.1991), Portugal (22.09.1976), 
Romania (07.10.1993), Russian Federation (28.02.1996), San Marino (16.11.1988), 
Serbia and Montenegro (03.04.2003), Slovakia (30.06.1993), Slovenia (14.05.1993), 
Spain (24.11.1977), Sweden (05.05.1949), Switzerland (06.05.1963), ”The former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (09.11.1995), Turkey (09.08.1949), Ukraine 
(09.11.1995)United Kingdom (05.05.1949). Council of Europe, at 
http://www.coe.int/T/e/com/about_coe/member_states/default.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 
2005). 
 111 Mark Janis, Russia and the 'Legality' of Strasbourg Law, EUR J. INT’L L. 93 
(1997).  
 112 Janis, supra note 106, at 46. 
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Conclusion 
 
 Over twenty years ago, international human rights law was not taken 
very seriously.  It was considered to be "soft law". However, over the years, 
there have been dozens of cases before the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights114 and thousands of cases in which the European Court of Human 
Rights115 have found states in violation of their international legal obligations 
with respect to human rights. Of those many rulings, only a few states have 
refused or been slow to comply with these Courts' orders. There is little doubt 
that now international human rights law is "hard law," i.e., effective law in 
many respects. Therefore, international human rights fora generally are both 
available, and provide remedies to violations of human rights with which 
states often comply.  
 
 Professor Douglass Cassel, the Director of the Center for 
International Human Rights at Northwestern University School of Law, has 
looked more at state compliance with international law in the Inter-American 
system than just about any other legal scholar.116  The judgments of the 
IACHR are considered "hard law" as they are legally binding.117  Cassel notes 
that:  
States have been more apt to comply with judgments and 
orders of the Court than with resolutions of the Commission.  
However, they do so in part because the Court, unlike the 
Commission, is a judicial body, and is also the second and 
final instance in the process, whereas the Commission is the 
first.  Greater compliance with Court orders, then, is due not 
only to the distinction between soft and hard law, but to the 
                                                                                                                    
 113 “On January 23, 2001, after former President Fujimori's flight to Japan and the 
establishment of an interim government, Peru notified the Court that it had 
repudiated, by legislative act, the prior notice of withdrawal from its jurisdiction and 
reestablished its recognition of the Court's competence. Peru's reaffirmation of its 
acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction is also manifest in the collaborative approach it 
has taken on pending cases.” Wilson & Perlin, supra note 7. 
 114 For a list of cases addressed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
see The Inter-American Court of Human Rights Website, at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecing/index_serie_c_ing.html (last visited June 24, 
2003).  
 115 Between November 1, 2002 and February 28, 2003 alone, the European Court 
of Human Rights dealt with 7031 cases. Human Rights Information Bulletin No. 58, 
Eur. Ct. H. R. at 2 (Nov. 2002- Feb. 2003).  
 116 Douglass Cassel, Jr., Inter-American Human Rights Law, Soft and Hard: 
What Difference? in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING 
NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 393-418 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). 
 117 Id. at 2. 
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differing nature of the promulgating institutions and their 
decision making processes.118 
 
 Cassel brings together legitimacy's "compliance pull" from Prof. 
Franck, the Chayes' "iterative process of discourse", as well as Koh's 
"transnational legal process" as mutually compatible theoretical 
frameworks for viewing the Inter-American system.119  All of these things 
point to a culture of compliance, an informal ideological regime—ideas 
akin to what Helfer and Slaughter put forth.120  To be a member in good 
standing of the informal "Latin American Club" so to say, a state would 
do well to comply with the judgments of the IACHR, at least cosmetically 
if not substantively.121  Otherwise, tacit but starkly understood 
repercussions follow from the other members of the "Club."122   
 
 Similar statements can be made about the Inter-American system.  Up 
to the present, compliance has been rather impressive in regards to financial 
reparations:  yet room for improvement exists with orders to States to 
prosecute such crimes in their domestic systems.   
 
 At present, much room yet exists for many further studies of 
compliance in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  This study comes 
as a single salvo in what could be a steady stream of scholarship on 
compliance in the Inter-American system yet to come.  May it encourage 
further analysis on this vitally important part of the pursuit of justice in this 
hemisphere!    
                                                 
 118 Id. at 3-4. 
 119 Id. at 4-5. 
 120 Id.  
 121 Interview with Professor Douglass Cassel, supra note 22.  
 122 Id.  
